, has over the years become the prototypical model of a system in which agents, competing for scarce resources, inductively adapt their belief-models to the aggregate environment that they jointly create. The works on the El Farol Bar problem which retained the best-reply learning of that seminal model show that, if the agents make use of global information, the aggregate attendance keeps fluctuating around the threshold level. Works where bestreply behavior has been replaced with reinforcement learning show that the system converges to an equilibrium characterized by a group of agents who always go to the bar and a group of agents who always stay at home. In this paper, we first introduce social networks: in our model, the agents take their decisions on the basis of their neighbors' past decisions. We investigate the effect of two network structures: the circular neighborhood and the von Neumann neighborhood. Simulations show, first, that the system always reaches a state of perfect coordination and, secondly, that many kinds of equilibria emerge, each of which is characterized by a certain number of classes in terms of attendance frequency. We then modify this network-based model by introducing minimum attendance thresholds. Simulations show that even with very low minimum attendance thresholds the equilibrium characterized by perfect equality is the most likely outcome. In particular, we show that it takes just one fourth of the agents with 'Keep-up-with-the Joneses' behavior to always lead the system to the perfect equality equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The El Farol Bar problem, introduced by [1] has over the years become the prototypical model of a system in which agents, competing for scarce resources, inductively adapt their belief-models (or hypotheses) to the aggregate environment they jointly create. The bar's capacity is basically a resource subject to congestion, making the El Farol Bar problem a stylized version of the central problem in public economics represented by the efficient exploitation of common-pool resources. Real-world examples of this problem include the traffic congestion and the congestion of computer networks. The numerous works that have analyzed and extended along different lines the El Farol Bar problem show that perfect coordination, that is, the steady state where the aggregate bar's attendance is always equal to the bar's maximum capacity, is very hard to reach, at least under the common knowledge assumption (see [2] - [4] ). In fact, with best-reply learning, as stated by Arthur, any commonalty of expectations gets broken up: If all believe few will go, all will go. But this would invalidate that belief. Similarly, if all believe most will go, nobody will go, invalidating that belief. Expectations will be forced to differ. ( [1] , p. 409).
On the other hand, works where best-response behavior has been replaced with reinforcement learning (see [5] , [6] ) show that perfect coordination is possible and that it is, indeed, the long-run behavior to which the system asymptotically converges [7] . However, it is an equilibrium characterized by complete segregation: the population split into a group of agents who always go (filling the bar up to its capacity at all times) and a group of agents who always stay at home.
In this paper, we sequentially introduce two modifications to the original setup, both of which represent a step towards the development of a 'socially oriented' version of the El Farol Bar problem. The first of these modifications concerns the structure of the agents' interaction and is represented by the introduction of a social network connecting the agents and through which the agents can access the information regarding their neighbors' choices and strategies. While in the original setup the agents base their decisions on global information, represented by the bar's aggregate attendance, a feature that is likely to cause herding behavior, making it very difficult for them to coordinate their activities, we may wonder whether coordination will be improved if, instead, the agents make use of local information, represented by the attendance of their closest neighbors. After having assessed the effect of this first modification, we introduce a second modification concerning the agents' individual preferences. In the original El Farol Bar problem setup the agents did not care about their attendance frequency (that is, how often they were going to the bar): the only thing that mattered to them was to make the right choice, even if it implied staying all the time at home. In this paper we assume, instead, that the agents are characterized by minimum attendance thresholds, satisfying levels below which the agent does not want to drop, no matter what the forecasting performance of their predictors is. After having assessed the effect of different fixed thresholds (both with homogeneous and heterogeneous populations) we will introduce social preferences, through the assumption that the agents' minimum attendance threshold is represented by the average of their neighbors' attendance frequencies (a decisionmaking process we will refer to as 'keep-up-with-the-Joneses' behavior). Through a series of simulations, we assess the effect of these socially-grounded assumptions on the macrodynamics of the El Farol Bar problem and on the kind of equilibria that the system eventually reaches.
Our main findings are: a) the introduction of social networks (and local information) allows the system to always reach an equilibrium characterized by perfect coordination, that is, a state where the bar's attendance is always equal to the bar's capacity); b) different network structures are characterized by different equilibria probability distributions; c) the equilibria reached by the system are by no means restricted to the equilibrium to which the El Farol Bar problem with reinforcement learning has been shown to converge asymptotically, with a group of agents always going and another group always staying at home (we will refer to this equilibrium as the two-class equilibrium, thereafter 2C). Instead, with the introduction of social networks, many kinds of equilibria, with different numbers of classes, emerge. In particular, we observe the emergence of an equilibrium characterized by perfect coordination with perfect equality, that is, a state in which the bar attendance is always equal to its capacity and where all the agents go to the bar with the same frequency (we will refer to this equilibrium as the one-class equilibrium, 1C thereafter); d) in homogeneous populations, even very low minimum attendance thresholds make the 1C equilibrium the most likely outcome. Moreover, in heterogeneous populations, even the presence of a small minority of agents with social preferences, in a population where the majority of agents have no preferences regarding their attendance frequencies, is sufficient to lead the system to the 1C equilibrium.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will present a brief review of the literature. In Section 3 we will describe the model and then, in Section 4, we will present the results of simulations. Finally, in Section 5 we will present the conclusions.
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
In this section, after introducing the original versions of the El Farol Bar problem and of the closely related Minority Game, we will consider some of the papers that have extended these two seminal models in various directions. In particular, we will focus on introducing of different leaning models to the El Farol Bar problem and the introduction of local interaction in the Minority Game (quite surprisingly, examples of the adoption of local interaction in the former and of different learning mechanisms in the latter are much rarer). In the first case, our aim is to provide a review of the macro-dynamics emerging from the models introduced so far, in order to have a background against which to compare the results obtained with the model we introduce in this paper. On the other hand, the papers that consider local interaction in the Minority Game show how the introduction of novel interaction structures has received considerable attention in previous works and, at the same time, allow us to see the crucial importance of the interaction structure to the macro-dynamics generated by these kinds of models.
A. The Seminal Models
In the original El Farol Bar problem [1] , N people decide independently, without collusion or prior communication, whether to go to a bar. Going is enjoyable only if the bar is not crowded, otherwise the agents would prefer to stay home. The bar is crowded if more than B people show up, whereas it is not crowded, and thus enjoyable, if attendees are B or fewer. Arthur assumes that all the agents know the attendance figures in the past m periods and each of them has a set of k predictors or hypotheses, in the form of functions that map the past t periods' attendance figures into next week's attendance. After each period, the predictors' performance indexes are updated according to the accuracy with which the various predictors forecasted the bar's attendance. Then, the agent selects the most accurate predictor and uses the relative forecast to decide whether to go to the bar or to stay at home the next period. Although the competitive process among predictors never comes to rest, it still produces a remarkable statistical regularity: at the macro level, the number of attendees fluctuates around the threshold level B, while, at the micro level, each agent goes B/N percent of the times, in the long run. [8] shows analytically how the method of inductive inference employed by the agents in Arthur's computer simulation leads the empirical distribution of aggregate attendance to be like those distributions in the set of Nash equilibria for the game. The author shows that this set is entirely composed of mixed strategies, even though the forecasting rules are entirely deterministic. [9] , in analyzing the El Farol Bar problem with the tools of statistical physics, find that for small m (short memory), the relative variance of the fluctuations around the resource level, σ 2 /N (that in this, as in other econophysics papers, is taken as a measure of the coordination level), displays a maximum when the agents are endowed with a set of strategies that make them choose to go to the bar with a frequency equal to the resource level. This suggests that a small bias in the strategies' prescriptions, of either sign, is beneficial as it reduces the fluctuations. They also find that the effect of the strategies' distribution becomes shallower as m (memory) increases and it disappears for m = 6. However, for large m, the average attendance does not converge to the resource level, so there is an intermediate memory length which is optimal for the collective behavior that depends on the number of agents N.
Inspired by the El Farol Bar problem, [10] proposed the Minority Game (MG). In the Minority Game there is a population of N players who have to choose an action (−1 or +1). In each period, the action chosen by the minority wins. The past m outcomes of the game are common knowledge.
To choose their next-period state, players use one of their k strategies among a set of strategies drawn at random from the pool of all conceivable strategies, each strategy being a lookup table assigning an action to any of the past winning actions' configurations. Similar to the El Farol Bar problem, the agents, to make their choice, select their best-performing strategy: after each period, the agents assign a point to all strategies that succeeded in predicting the winning action (regardless of whether they were actually used or not) and zero to the others. The main difference between the two models, apart from the different threshold B/N (respectively 0.6 and 0.5), is that, while in the former no explicit assumption is made regarding the number of agents N (it is set to 100 in Arthur's model), in the MG it is explicitly assumed that N is an odd number, an assumption that, together with the 50% threshold, ensures that there is always a minority side.
Simulations show that, although the two actions are chosen, as one may expect, 50% of the times in the long run, the average fluctuations' size around the average, a measure of the efficiency with which the system exploits the scarce resources, is inversely proportional to the size of the agents' memory m, at least up to m ≈ 6. Moreover, simulations show that, contrary to what one may expect, increasing the number of strategies the players are endowed with in general tends to decrease their performance. In the same paper, Challet and Zhang introduce an 'evolutionary' version of the MG where the worst player is replaced by a new one after some time steps, with the new player being a clone of the best player. To maintain some heterogeneity, a mutation process is introduced: one of the best player's strategies is replaced by a new one, randomly drawn from the whole strategy space. The social learning that takes place in this evolutionary MG makes the average fluctuations' size decrease over time. Moreover, if the memory size m is allowed to change through this evolutionary process, simulations show that an 'arms race' takes place among the players, with the memory size increasing up to a 'saturation' level that increases with the agents' population size.
However, in spite of the many similarities, the two models differ on one fundamental point: whereas in the MG, as said before, there is always a majority side that makes the wrong choice, in the El Farol Bar problem there is the possibility to hit exactly the target B, a situation where all the agents, no matter what they decided, made the right choice. This difference makes the average aggregate payoff move in opposite directions as we increase the number of agents N, while in the MG the average aggregate payoff is inversely proportional to the aggregate attendance fluctuations' size and, consequently, increases with the number of agents N. In the El Farol Bar problem, it decreases with N. This is because, in this problem, the average aggregate payoff is composed of a negative component, represented by the average aggregate payoff of the times the aggregate attendance is below or above the threshold, and a positive component, represented by the average aggregate payoff of the times the aggregate attendance is exactly equal to the threshold B. Now, while the first component gets smaller as N increases because of the reduction in the fluctuations' size, the second component also gets smaller, as with a higher N the probability of hitting the target decreases. Simulations show that the net effect is negative: as we increase N, the positive component becomes smaller more quickly than the negative one, decreasing the average aggregate payoff. So, we can say that, while in the MG the coordination problem tends to fade away as we increase N, in the El Farol Bar problem, it tends to get worse.
B. Changing the Learning Mechanisms in the El Farol Bar Problem
Among the papers introducing novel learning mechanisms in the El Farol Bar problem, we can distinguish two groups of works: those that retain the best-reply behavior of Arthur's El Farol Bar problem and those introducing reinforcement learning mechanisms. In the first group, [3] proposes an extension of the El Farol Bar problem where agents can change their strategies set by the means of a genetic programming (GP) algorithm and are given the chance to communicate with other agents before making their decision as to whether to go to El Farol Bar. Simulations show that, although all agents were indistinguishable at the start of the run in terms of their resources and computational structure, they evolved not only different models but also very distinct strategies and roles. However, as in the original model, the attendance at the bar fluctuates around the threshold level, and does not seem to settle down into any regular pattern.
Another work where the agents' strategies are allowed to co-evolve is that of [2] . In the model they propose, the agents are endowed with 10 predictors that take the form of autoregressive models with the number of lag terms and the relative coefficients being the variables that evolve over time. For each predictor, one offspring is created (with mutation). The 10 models having the lowest prediction error for the past 12 weeks of data are selected to be the parent of the next generation. Their simulations show that the system, in a typical trial, has a lower average aggregate attendance (around 56.3%) and a higher standard deviation (17.6) than the ones resulting from Arthur's model.
More recently, [4] explore the effect of (i) the different types of algorithms used by the agents, (ii) the strategy employed to select algorithms from this pool, and (iii) the memory horizon for which attendance data are available to the agents. They show that whether the average attendance will converge to the threshold level or not depends on the algorithm selection procedures of the agents. Changing the algorithm used whenever it fails, irrespective of the past success of the algorithm, and picking up another one randomly, drives the average attendance to the comfort level, as the agents use more information from the past.
Other works have abandoned the best-reply behavior to adopt the more basic reinforcement learning framework. One of the first works where the best-reply behavior of the Arthur's original model has been replaced by a kind of reinforcement learning is that of [5] . In this paper, the authors present an agent-based model where the agents' strategies are represented by an integer c determining the agents' attendance frequency: if c = 2 the agent goes to the bar once every 2 periods; if c = 3 he goes once every 3 periods and so on. Every time an agent goes to the bar and has a good time (because the bar was not too crowded) he decreases c (goes more often) whereas, in the opposite case, he increases c (goes less often). No change in the attendance frequency takes place if the agent stays at home, as it is assumed that he cannot assess whether he made the right choice or not. Subsequently, [6] proposed a reinforcement learning model that, although quite elaborate, for the purpose of this paper can be summarized as follows: each agent goes to the bar with a probability p. If the bar is not crowded he increases p, while if the bar turns out to be too crowded, he decreases p. If the agent stays at home, a parameter u determines the extent to which the attendance probability is updated according to the bar's aggregate attendance. In both papers, simulations show that the populations tend to split in two groups: a group of frequent bar-goers and a group of agents who very seldom go to the bar. This result has been analytically obtained by [7] . By applying the [11] model of reinforcement learning to the El Farol Bar framework, he shows that the long-run behavior converges asymptotically to the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the El Farol stage game.
This relatively short literature review has allowed us to see that: the best-reply learning produces, in the El Farol Bar problem, fluctuations around the threshold level B/N (or near this threshold level): with this learning mechanism, the agentscannot successfully coordinate. On the other hand, the adoption of reinforcement learning mechanisms leads the system to a state of perfect coordination. However this equilibrium is characterized by the complete segregation of the population between agents who always go to the bar and agents who always stay at home.
III. THE MODEL
In the model we present, we retain the best-reply strategies of the original El Farol Bar problem. However, we modify the standard settings by adopting the informational structure introduced by the works on the MG with local interaction. As in the original El Farol Bar problem, we consider a population composed of N = 100 agents and set the attendance threshold B/N = 0.6. Contrary to the prototypical El Farol Bar problem and MG settings, each agent is assigned, at the beginning of the simulation, only one strategy s, randomly chosen from the whole strategy space. The strategy is composed of 16 rules specifying the action D the agent has to take in the current period, one rule for each of the 16 combinations of his four neighbors' actions in the previous period, as shown in Fig. 1 (where 1 stands for "Go to the bar" and 0 stands for "Stay at home"). So, the strategies are represented by 16-bit long strings, with a strategy space of 2 16 possible strategies (note, at this point, that we have the typical settings of cellular automata). Implicit in the strategy's definition, is the agents' capability to 'see' the actions of four other agents (his neighbors, denoted by N1, N2, N3 and N4). In this paper, we investigate two network typologies shown in Fig. 2 : the circular neighborhood, where each agent is connected to the two agents to his left and the two agents to his right; and the von Neumann neighborhood, with the agents occupying a cell in a bidimensional grid covering the surface of a torus.
We define the variable d i (t) as the action taken by agent i in period t: it takes the value 1 if the agent goes to the bar and the value 0 otherwise. Moreover, we define the variable b i (t) as the outcome of agent i's decision in period t: it takes the value 1 if the agent took the right decision (that is, if he went to the bar and the bar was not crowded or if he stayed at home and the bar was too crowded) and it takes value 0 if the agents took the wrong decision (that is, if he went to the bar and the bar was too crowded or if he stayed at home and the bar was not crowded). The agents are endowed with a memory of length m. This means that they store in two vectors, 
The attendance frequency's value can go from 1, if the agent always went to the bar, to 0, if the agent never went to the bar, in the last m periods. Moreover, agent i's forecasting success, f i , is given by (2):
The forecasting success's value can go from 1, if the agent always made the right choice, to 0, if the agent always made the wrong choice, in the last m periods. We define the agent i current strategy's age, r i , as the number of periods the agent is using his current strategy. In order for the average attendance and the forecasting success associated with any strategy to be computed, it has to be adopted for a number of periods equal to the agents' memory size m: so, we can think of m as the trial period of a strategy (we will set this value to 10 for all the agents in all our simulations). We assume that each agent is characterized by a minimum attendance threshold, α i , that is, an attendance frequency below which the agent does not want to dip. It can take any value from 0, if the agents do not care about their attendance frequency, to 0.6 (we assume that, although the agents want to go to the bar as often as they can, they do not claim to go with an attendance frequency higher than the threshold B/N). Differing from the traditional El Farol Bar problem setup, the agents' strategies are not fixed, but they evolve through both social learning (imitation) and individual learning (mutation). So, the social network plays a role both in the agents' decision process, allowing the agents to gather information regarding their neighbors' choices, and in the agents' learning process, allowing the agents to imitate their neighbors' strategies. In any given period, an agent i imitates the strategy of one of his neighbors if the following six conditions are met: a) f i < 1 and/or a i < α i b) r i ≥ m i (that is, the agent's strategy in not in its trial period) and the agent has at least one neighbor j for which the following conditions are verified:
If the first two conditions are met but at least one of the last four is not (that is, if the agent has not yet reached yet the optimal strategy and in the current period he cannot imitate any of his neighbors) the agent, with a probability p, will mutate a randomly chosen rule on its strategy while with probability 1 − p he will keep using his present strategy. As mentioned in the Introduction, we will first consider a version of the El Farol bar problem with a social network but no minimum attendance thresholds. In this case, the same learning mechanism applies but with the minimum attendance threshold set to 0: the agents decide whether or not to imitate their neighbors only on the basis of the strategies' forecasting success values.
While the imitation process ensures that the most successful strategies are spread in the population, the mutation process ensures that new, eventually better, strategies are introduced over time. Once the agent has adopted a new strategy (either through imitation or mutation) he will reset his memory to zero and will start keeping track of the new strategy's fitness. The agent stops both the imitation and the mutation processes if the two following conditions are met:
When these two conditions are verified for all the agents, the system reaches the equilibrium: no further change in the agents' behavior takes place after this point as the agents always take the right decision and go to the bar with a satisfying attendance frequency.
In the next section, we will show the results of simulations based on two version of the El Farol Bar problem: in the first version we introduce the social network's structure and set the minimum attendance thresholds to 0 (in other words, in this version the agents, like in the original model, do not care about their attendance frequency). In this way, we are able to assess how the outcomes are affected by the introduction of social networks and, in particular, the effect of different network structures on the equilibria distribution. Then, we introduce a second version where we set the agents' minimum attendance thresholds to some positive values, in the context of a network structure represented by the von Neumann neighborhood. In this second set of simulations, we will not consider the circular neighborhood as in this part our aim is to assess the effect of the introduction of minimum attendance thresholds on the equilibria distribution. To summarize, in the next section, we will show the results of simulations based on the following models: a) the El Farol Bar problem with, in turn, the circular neighborhood and the von Neumann neighborhood (but no minimum attendance thresholds). This first round of simulations will allow us to assess the effect of different network structures on the kinds of equilibria reached by the system. b) the El Farol Bar problem with the von Neumann neighborhood and the following minimum attendance thresholds:
• fixed minimum attendance thresholds in a homogeneous population (that is a population where all the agents have the same threshold). In particular we will consider the following minimum attendance thresholds: 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5; • endogenous minimum attendance thresholds in a heterogeneous population. In particular we will consider the case where part of the population has no threshold and the remaining part has a threshold equal to the average of their neighbors' average attendances (the so-called 'keep-up-with-the-Joneses' behavior). 
IV. RESULTS OF SIMULATIONS

A. Social Networks Without Minimum Attendance Thresholds
In this case, the system, with both the circular neighborhood and the von Neumann neighborhood, always reaches the perfect coordination, that is, the state where the bar attendance is always equal to the threshold (and, consequently, the agents never make the wrong choice). Fig. 3 shows the attendances for a typical run (in this case, with the von Neumann neighborhood). We can see that, in this example, the equilibrium is reached at around period 5000. Next, we turn our attention to the attendance frequencies' distribution in the population of agents. From Fig. 4 we can see that the introduction of social networks leads to the emergence of different kinds of equilibria. For simplicity, we can classify them on the basis of the number of different classes that emerge, each class being characterized by different attendance frequencies (consequently, we will refer to the different kinds of equilibria as 1C, 2C and so on). In fact, even if two given equilibria are characterized by the same number of classes, they could differ along other dimensions: the classes in the two equilibria could be related to different attendance frequencies (for example, 0.5/0.6/0.7 and 0.0/0.5/1.0, in the case of two 3C equilibria) or, even if the classes represent the same attendance frequencies, they could have different sizes (for example, in two 3C equilibria characterized by the three classes of attendance frequencies 0.5/0.6/0.7, the relative size of each class could be 0.1/0.8/0.1 for the first equilibrium and 0.3/0.4/0.3 for the second one). Fig. 4 shows the percentage for each kind of equilibria (over 1000 runs), for the circular neighborhood (CN) and the von Neumann neighborhood (vNN). We can see that, while the 2C equilibrium remains the most likely outcome, with the von Neumann neighborhood the system has a not negligible probability of reaching the 1C equilibrium. The fact that the systems has relatively good chances to reach the perfectly equitable equilibrium 1 is a quite interesting result considering that, in this version, agents have no minimum attendance thresholds: it is, in fact, the second most likely equilibrium, with a probability of almost one third of that of the 2C equilibrium. Within the equilibria characterized by the emergence of two classes (2C), the great majority (over 90%) are represented by the well-known 60/40 subdivision between the agents who always go to the bar and those who always stay at home. The rest (less than 10%) are represented by a new equilibrium characterized by 80 agents going to the bar with an attendance frequency of 0.5 and 20 agents with an attendance frequency of 1.0 (note that 80% * 0.5 + 20% * 1.0 = 60%). The great majority of the 3C equilibria are represented by an equilibrium where some agents never go to the bar, some always go and the rest go with an attendance frequency of 0.5. Another relatively frequent outcome is the emergence of five classes (5C). To sum up, the simulations show that the introduction of social networks allows the system to always reach an equilibrium characterized by perfect coordination, that is, a state where the bar's attendance is always equal to the bar's capacity). Moreover, different network structures are characterized by different equilibria probability distributions: for example, as we see from Fig. 4 , the 1C equilibrium is much more likely to emerge with the von Neumann neighborhood (18%) than with the circular neighborhood (2%). Finally, we observe that, while the literature on the El Farol Bar problem had identified only one kind of equilibrium, that is, the well-known 2C equilibrium with the 60/40 division between agents always going to the bar and agents always staying at home, the introduction of social networks leads to the emergence of many different kinds of equilibria, with each of them being characterized by a different number of classes. Particularly interesting, given the absence of any minimum attendance thresholds, is the emergence (in particular with the von Neumann neighborhood) of the 1C equilibrium, a state where not only the agents reach perfect coordination, but they also go to the bar with the same frequency of 0.6. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the relative shares, over 100 runs, of the various kinds of equilibria (1C, 2C and so on), when we increase the minimum attendance threshold from 0.1 to 0.6. We can see that if the agents all have the same threshold of 0.1 (that is, the agents are satisfied if their attendance frequency is equal or above 0.1) the 1C equilibrium is already the most likely outcome (around 40%), followed by the 2C equilibrium (around 30%). As we increase the minimum attendance threshold, the frequency of the 1C equilibrium increases while the frequencies of all the others decrease, at different rates. Of course, with a minimum threshold level of 0.6, the system reaches the 1C equilibrium 100% of the times, as it is the only equilibrium compatible with this satisfying level.
B. Introducing Fixed Minimum Attendance Thresholds 1) Homogeneous population:
C. Introducing the 'Keep-up-with-the Joneses' Behavior
While in the previous simulations the agents were characterized by an exogenously fixed minimum attendance threshold, in these simulations the agents' minimum attendance threshold is endogenously determined, being the average of the attendance frequencies of their neighbors. In other words, the agents characterized by the 'keep-up-with-the-Joneses' behavior do not want to be, among their neighborhood, those going to the bar with a frequency lower than the average (KUWJ agents, thereafter). Just as for the 0.6 minimum attendance threshold, in this case it is relatively easy to see that if all the agents in the population try to 'keep-up-withthe-Joneses', the system will inevitably end up reaching the 1C equilibrium, this being the only state where no agent goes to the bar with a frequency lower than the average (that is, where all the agents go to the bar with the same frequency). So, as in the previous simulations, we will look at how the frequency of the 1C equilibrium changes when, starting from a population entirely composed of agents who do not care about their attendance frequency, we increase the number of KUWJ agents. Fig. 6 shows the evolution of the relative shares, over 100 runs, of the 1C, 2C and more-than-2C equilibria, when we increase the number of these agents from 0 to 29. We can see that, by and large, the dynamics of the equilibria frequencies is similar to the case with the 0.6 minimum attendance threshold: in this case, with more than 11 KUWJ agents, the 1C equilibrium becomes the most likely outcome. Moreover, it takes only around 25% of the KUWJ agents to lead the system to the perfectly equitable outcome, more than with the 0.6 minimum attendance threshold but still a relatively small minority.
D. Looking into the 1C Equilibrium
Given the ubiquity of the 1C equilibrium, we now turn our attention to the strategies characterizing this equilibrium. Fig.  7 shows the four strategies emerging with the von Neumann neighborhood when the 1C equilibrium is reached. We can see that, even if the whole strategies are composed of 16 binary numbers, corresponding to the 16 possible combinations of the agent's four neighbors' actions, at the equilibrium a cyclical pattern composed by three combinations emerges, so that only three of the strategy's 16 rules are in fact used by the agents. Moreover, looking at Fig. 7 we can see how, at the equilibrium, the agents do not need to look at all their four neighbors' actions anymore, as each of the four emerging strategies is equivalent to the action of two of their four neighbors. In fact, if we look at the von Neumann neighborhood of Fig. 2 , we can see that each of the four strategies corresponds to the actions of two adjacent neighbors: the neighbor N1 or N3 for Strategy 1 (shown in bold); the neighbor N2 or N4 for Strategy 2; the neighbor N1 or N4 for Strategy 3 (shown in bold); and the neighbor N2 or N3 for Strategy 4. So, all the agents need to do in order to maintain the socially optimal equilibrium, once it has been reached, it is to follow simple rules based on the previous action of just one of their neighbors: if, for example, Strategy 1 emerges, the rule to follow is "Do what your neighbors N1 or N3 did in the last period", and similarly for the other three strategies. We have to note that there is no Fig. 8 . A snapshot of the rules adopted (left) and the actions taken (right) by the 100 agents once the equilibrium has been reached. In the simulation we would see the diagonals 'move' one step eastward in every period.
guarantee, and indeed it is very unlikely, that the system would have ever reached the socially optimal equilibrium if the agents were to follow these simple rules from the beginning. Fig. 8 presents a snapshot of the rules used by the 100 agents and the consequent action, for a typical run, once the equilibrium has been reached. In this example, we can see that the strategy emerging at the equilibrium is Strategy 4 of Table  3 : the agents periodically face three kinds of inputs (0-1-1-0, 1-0-0-1 or 1-1-1-1) and, consequently, use only three rules (Rules 7, 10 and 16). The agents, in this case, may take their decisions simply by looking at the previous action of either their neighbor on the left, N2, or their neighbor at the top, N3.
Finally, we observe that the 1C equilibrium is characterized by the emergence of three cycles: a 5-period cycle (1-1-1-0-0) and two 10-period cycles (1-1-1-1-0-0-1-1-0-0 and 1-1-0-0-1-1-0-1-1-0). The three cycles can be generated by any of the four strategies shown in Fig. 7 . For instance, Fig. 8 shows a snapshot of an equilibrium characterized by the 10-period cycle 1-1-1-1-0-0-1-1-0-0 (the diagonals highlighted in Fig. 8 'move' one step eastward in every period).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduce a new version of the El Farol Bar problem characterized by: a) the presence of social networks through which the agents can access the information regarding their neighbors' choices and imitate their strategies; b) the introduction of preferences that take into account the frequency with which the agents go to the bar. The resulting macro-dynamics turned out to be very different from the one characterized by irregular fluctuations around the threshold level emerging from the original El Farol Bar problem. Our intuition whereby, by using local information, the agents could overcome the problem of herd behavior, generating the use of global information and, consequently, being able to improve their coordination, has proved to be correct. 2 In fact, our results show that the introduction of social networks (and local information) allows the system to always reach an equilibrium characterized by perfect coordination, that is, a state where the bar's attendance is always equal to the bar's capacity. However, not all network structures are alike, as different network structures are characterized by different equilibria probability distributions. In particular, our simulations showed that the von Neumann neighborhood seems to be more conducive to the 1C equilibrium than the circular neighborhood.
Moreover, by looking into the kinds of equilibria that emerged at the equilibrium, we observe that with the introduction of social networks, many kinds of equilibria, characterized by different numbers of classes, emerge. In particular, we observe the emergence of an equilibrium characterized by perfect coordination with perfect equality, that is, a state where the bar attendance is always equal to its capacity and all the agents go to the bar with the same frequency. With the introduction of homogeneous minimum attendance thresholds, we could observe that even at very low minimum attendance thresholds, the 1C equilibrium becomes the most likely outcome.
Finally, in heterogeneous populations, we showed that it takes just 25% of agents with 'keep-up-with-the Joneses' preferences to reach the perfect-equality equilibrium where not only the bar's capacity is exploited to the full, but all the agents go to the bar with the same frequency. Summing up, we can say that while the introduction of social networks 'solve' the El Farol Bar problem, as it allows the system to reach a state of perfect coordination, the additional assumptions regarding minimum attendance thresholds makes the equitable solution, where all the agents go to the bar with the same frequency, the most likely one.
